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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, after several years of study, prototype devel-
opment, and intense collaboration with the United States Postal
Service, Burroughs Corporation, under contract with the Postal Serv-
ice, began manufacture of a massive seventy-seven foot long and
nine-foot high automatic letter sorting machine consisting of twelve
two-tier, piano-style keyboard work stations where Postal Service op-
erators would rapidly sort the United States mail.' Over the years,
Burroughs produced close to nine hundred of these machines for
the Postal Service. Unfortunately, postal workers across the country
routinely using these machines suffered severe repetitive-stress dis-
eases such as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis, numbness,
tingling, and tendinitis in the fingers, hands, wrists, and arms.'
The government and the manufacturer acquired information
about these risks and the machine's ergonomic deficiencies as early
as the 1960s. In fact, in 1966 and again in 1977 the manufacturer
suggested modifications to the design of the machine in order to re-
duce worker stress, but the government refused to permit changes.3
Now, in the 1990s, claims against the manufacturer by Postal Service
employees, crippled as a result of their use of the letter sorting ma-
chines, have been denied.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. The author thanks
Richard L. DeRobertis for his thoughtful comments.
I See Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D.D.C. 1996). Unisys
is the successor corporation to Burroughs. See id.
2 See id. at 901.
3 SeeAndrewv. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821, 828 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
4 See, e.g., Pierce v. Unisys Corp., No. 94-2324, 1997 WL 391809 (D.N.J.July 12,
1997); Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710 (D. Md. 1997); Houghtaling v.
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When is it reasonable to shield a manufacturer of a defective
product from liability on the grounds that "[t]he [g]overnment
made me do it"5 or that it "was just following orders?" When should
the freedom from liability to injured individuals for the manufacture
of defective products for the government outweigh recurring "harm
to individual citizens" and justify contravening "the basic tenet that
individuals be held accountable for their wrongful conduct[?] 6
Over fifty years ago, Justice Roger Traynor wrote:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared
to meet its consequences. The cost of any injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business.7
Despite Justice Traynor's eloquent justification for imposing broad
manufacturer liability, eight years ago, a deeply divided United States
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp." answered the
question of whether a government contractor should be excused from
liability for the manufacture of a defective product for the govern-
ment in the affirmative. The Court failed, however, to give clear
guidance to lower courts in determining when to excuse contractors
from state product liability law. Now, considerable divergence exists
among the federal circuits.9
Unisys Corp., 955 F. Supp. 309 (D.NJ. 1996); Haltiwanger, 949 F. Supp. 898; Fagans
v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1996); Andrew, 936 F. Supp. 821; Russek v.
Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277 (D.NJ. 1996); Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp.
1501 (D. Kan. 1996); Crespo v. Unisys Corp., No. 94-2339, 1996 WL 875565 (D.NJ.
June 21, 1996).
In rejoint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990).
£ Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 523 (1988) (5-4 decision)
(Brennan,J., dissenting).
7 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1962). For a discussion of principles underlying product liability and critical as-
sessment, see generally 2 FowLER V. HARPER & FLEMINGJAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §
28.1 (1956); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALELJ. 499 (1961); Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allo-
cation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. R~v. 1329 (1966); Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The
Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 197 (1997); Gary T. Schwartz,
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 377, 405-13 (1994);John J. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983).
8 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
See id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that "the Court's newly dis-
covered Government contractor defense is breathtakingly sweeping").
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Defining the breadth of Boyle has divided the federal courts. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has refused to extend the defense be-
yond military procurement. ° It reads Boyle narrowly, allowing only
military contractors producing military equipment not ordinarily
sold on the commercial market to invoke the defense." Other courts
extend the defense to any government contractor whose work passes
Boyle's three-part test. The government contractor defense has been
extended to include the following: manufacturers of letter sorting
equipment for the United States Postal Service; postal vehicles;"
ambulances; 4 military air conditioners; 15 army surplus tree-trimming
belts;'6 service contracts for the Department of Energy;" a security
guard service for a federal building; and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency' 9-provided the process of formulating contract specifi-
cations passes Boyle's three-prong test.
10 See infra notes 11-131 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Ninth
Circuit's refusal to extend the defense beyond military procurement.
n See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806,811-12 (9th Cir. 1992).
1 See, e.g., Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710 (D. Md. 1997); Hough-
taling v. Unisys Corp., 955 F. Supp. 309 (D.N.J. 1996); Haliwanger v. Unisys Corp.,
949 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1996); Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.
1996); Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Russek v. Uni-
sys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277 (D.N.J. 1996); Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp.
1501 (D. Kan. 1996).
13 See Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 213 (W.D. Wis. 1992)
(finding that the defense extends beyond military contracts in case of injury due to
postal service vehicle).
1' See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993) (nonmilitary
ambulance), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
15 See Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the government contractor defense applies to air conditioning unit built to
maintain military equipment).
16 See Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 643 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the government contractor defense applies to tree-trimming belt designed for
use during Korean war and subsequently sold through army surplus).17 See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 963 (W.D. Ky.
1993) (concluding that government contractor defense was available to a private
contractor operating a uranium production plant for the Department of Energy).
Another performance contract case extended the defense to a United Nations con-
tractor. See Askir v. Brown & Root Servs. Corp., No. 95-11008, 1997 WL 598587
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23 1997) (applying defense to private contractor providing logistical
supgort to United Nations's peacekeeping operation in Somalia).
See Guillory v. Ree's Contract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 346 (S.D. Miss.
1994) (holding government contractor defense applies to a security service for Vet-
erans Administration building).19 See Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 854 F. Supp.
400, 424 (D.S.C. 1994) (determining government contractor defense applies to
company obtained for EPA clean up).
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There is also little consonance among federal courts as to how
Boyle applies to the separate state-law tort claim that a government
contractor breached its common-law duty to warn product users of
dangers.20 Notably, the Fifth Circuit and some lower courts broadly
hold that a contractor is excused from the state-law duty to warn
whenever the manufacturer has effectively invoked Boyle as to the re-
lated design defect, thus virtually negating the possibility of asserting
a separate state-law failure-to-warn claim if Boyle applies to the design
process." At the other end of the spectrum, the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits permit the government contractor defense to ex-
cuse contractors from their common-law duty to warn only when the
government specifications actually precluded warnings or the speci-
fications otherwise placed the contractor in conflict with its state-law
duty to warn.' The Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits along with
certain lower courts have reached a middle ground by allowing a
contractor to invoke the defense against a failure-to-warn claim only
when the government approved reasonably precise warnings or ap-
proved the absence of warnings.3
This article explores the application of Boyle in the context of
federal procurement law among the federal courts. It challenges the
emerging majority view that the governmental and economic under-
pinnings of Boyle are sufficiently strong in the nonmilitary context to
warrant application of the defense in those cases. Boyle expressed
concern that a lack of a contractor's defense would interfere with a
federal officer's exercise of discretion, which is protected under the
Federal Tort Claims Act,24 and would cause economic harm to the
government as manufacturers passed on product-liability costs. I ar-
20 See Russek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277, 1286-94 (D.NJ. 1996)
(describing a split among the circuits and explaining that the Boyle defense is appli-
cable to failure to warn when the Boyle defense is established as to design defect and
relevant specifications were silent as to warnings).
21 See infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text for an analysis of this interpre-
tation of Boyle.
22 See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text for an analysis of the position
of the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
23 See infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text for an analysis of the middle
ground taken by the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.
24 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Sovereign immunity is not a be-
loved legal doctrine and there appears a "latent trend toward abolishing many
forms of sovereign immunity previously recognized." Peretti v. Montana, 777 P.2d
329, 332 (Mont. 1989); see also Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968,
969 (Colo. 1971) ("The monarchical philosophies invented to solve the marital
problems of Henry VIII are not sufficient justification for the denial of the right of
recovery against the government in today's society.... [O]ur forbears [sic] won the
Revolutionary War to rid themselves of such sovereign prerogatives").
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gue that these federal interests are only sufficient to justify displace-
ment of state tort law in the military context and that the conse-
quences of passed-on procurement costs affect the government posi-
tively. Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, I argue that Boyle should not
be applied where no unique federal interests are at stake. In addi-
tion, neither the fear of passed-on costs nor concern for undermin-
ing discretionary functions justifies usurping state law unless the
economic consequences or the impact on discretion are cloaked in
national security or other military-defense issues.
As to the duty to warn, I argue that outside of the military arena,
where soldiers generally must perform regardless of certain risks,
contractors should not be excused for failing to warn of dangers as-
sociated with product use. Moreover, even within the military, con-
tractors should be held to state tort law warning requirements unless
precluded from warning under the specifications of the contract.
II. BOYLE V. UNITED TECHINOLOG1S CORP.: CONCERN FOR ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES AND UNDERMINING FEDERAL DISCRETION
A. Do Uniquely Federal Interests Significantly Conflict With Operation
of State Law?
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in 1988, the government
contractor defense fulminated in the appellate circuits for a number
of years without a cohesive intellectual underpinning.5 Something
akin to a government contractor defense protected government con-
tractors from Fifth Amendment takings claims when performing un-
der exacting public works contracts on an agency theory.' In the
product liability area, some courts grounded the defense in the Feres-
Stencel doctrine," in the Separation of Powers Doctrine,28 through an
See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC
Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v.J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.
1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). Compare In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 847-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
with In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1273
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) for anomalous holdings. See also generaUyJuanita M. Madole, ed.,
The Government Contractor Defense: A Fair Defense or the Contractor's Shield?, 1986 A.B.A.
SEC. TORT AND INSURANCE PRAClE 3-46 (tracing the history of the defense prior to
Boyle).
26.See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20 (1940) (invoking the
agency theory).
See infra note 76; see also McKay, 704 F.2d at 451; In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
28 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985)
(concluding defense is only applicable if contractor proves it did not participate or
[Vol. 28:430434
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extension of sovereign immunity,29 or under state law." Finally, in
Boyle, the United States Supreme Court put to rest the question of
whether a federal common-law defense existed and identified the
source of the defense. However, even before the ink dried on the
Court's opinion, litigants knew that the Court's identification of the
source of the defense raised as many questions as it answered'
In Boyle, copilot Lieutenant David Boyle drowned following the
crash of his United States Marine Corps Sikorsky helicopter. His fa-
ther alleged that the outward-opening escape hatch was ineffective in
an underwater crash and that its handle was obstructed by other
equipment.3 2 A jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
the lower court denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that as a matter of federal law
the government contractor defense shielded Sikorsky from liability
for the defective design.34 On review, the United States Supreme
Court for the first time recognized a government contractor defense
as a matter of federal common law."
In Boy/e; the Supreme Court both recognized the government
contractor defense and identified the rationale for precluding the
imposition of state tort liability on government contractors in certain
circumstances. The Court announced that the preemption of state
law by the defense first required that a "unique federal interest" was
at stake. The Court determined that a unique federal interest ex-
isted "in the context of government procurement."6 The Court ex-
plained, however, that establishing the existence of a unique federal
interest was merely a necessary-but not a sufficient-condition of
only minimally participated in the design of the products or product parts and
warned the military of known risks). Shaw's formulation of the defense was rejected
in Boye. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988).
See Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that
the "contractor has acted in the sovereign's stead"); Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co.,
772 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1985) (examining nonmilitary manufacture of animal
vaccine).
' See Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1086, 1044-45 (5th Cir.
1984) (finding that state-law sovereign immunity is the rationale behind the de-
fense).
31 See generally A.L. Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort Liability: A
Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 117 (1989) (highlighting unresolved issues).




' See id. at 506 (quoting Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29, 33 (1956)).
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preemption.37 The Court also held that preemption required the
contractor to demonstrate that "a 'significant conflict' exist[ed] be-
tween an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the [operation]
of state law[.]'"" The Court identified the "potential for,
and... outlines of" that significant conflict in the federal govern-
ment's interest in protecting the federal benefits derived from its
discretionary function immunity." The Court justified the defense
based upon two interests protected by the discretionary function-
one economic and the other governmental.4 The imposition of
state tort law, the Court reasoned, jeopardized both interests.'
The Court explained that an economic detriment would occur
without government-contractor immunity because "the contractor
will [either] decline to manufacture the design specified by the gov-
ernment, or it will raise its price."42 "The financial burden of judg-
ments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through,
substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since defense
contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure
against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs."
43
The Court expressed concern that the economic benefits of the
United States's discretionary immunity from suit for discretionary
acts would be circumvented by the imposition of pass-through costs
at the outset of the manufacturing contract.
Equally important to protecting the government's economic in-
terests, the Court also feared that without the defense a manufac-
turer's exposure to state-law liability would undermine the purpose
behind discretionary-function immunity enjoyed by federal officers
and could place the contractor at odds with the federal interests the
contractor served through performance of the contract. As the
Court explained:
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discre-
31 See id. at 507.
Boye, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63, 68 (1966)).
39 See id. at 511. The "unique federal interest" in procurement that the Court
found is a necessary but not sufficient condition of preemption is not identical to
the federal policy or interest that the Court determined was in substantial conflict
with state law. The federal policy in conflict with state law is the government's in-
terest in protecting the procurement benefits derived from the immunity granted
federal officers exercising discretion under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
4 Seeid.
41 Seeid.
42 Id. at 507.
43 Id. at511-12.
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tionary function .... It often involves not merely engineering
analysis butjudgment as to the balancing of many technical, mili-
tary, and even social considerations, including specifically the
trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.
And we are further of the view that permitting "second-guessing"
of thesejudgments... through state tort suits against contractors
would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the
[Federal Tort Claims Act] exemption.
Thus, at least in the context of military equipment, the Court
recognized that a contractor's fear of liability could alter its relation-
ship with federal officers exercising discretion when designing or
approving designs for government purchases.
B. Boyle's Three-Part Test
After identifying the source of the "significant conflict" in gov-
ernment procurement as between state-law tort liability and its im-
pact on discretionary acts by federal employees making procurement
decisions, the Court next articulated its three-part test for determin-
ing when to insulate federal contractors:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be im-
posed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United
States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were
known to the supplier but not to the United States.45
The Court reasoned that the first two conditions assured that
the defense was only invoked when the policies underlying the dis-
cretionary function were in conflict with state law.4 The Court also
noted that the third requirement ensured that government contrac-
tors disclosed all knowledge of product risks to the government.
This requirement helped assure that the government officer approv-
ing the design possessed sufficient information to exercise discretion
intelligently.4 7
As to the first prong, courts generally agree that under Boyle, "it
is necessary only that the government approve, rather than create,
the specifications."48 However, the government approval must not be
4 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
45 Id. at 512.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 Carleyv. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1993).
19971
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merely "rubber stamping"49 and must reflect "continuous back and
forth"0 review of the design process. The specifications must be
"detailed, precise and typically quantitative" as opposed to "[g]eneral
qualitative specifications."' Generalized specifications "calling for
such vagaries as a failsafe, simple or inexpensive product.., are
[not] relevant to the government contractor defense."02 The exami-
nation of the approval relationship between the government officer
and the contractor is necessary to establish that discretion of the of-
ficer is actually implicated." However, the government officer need
not design the product so long as the officer approved the specifica-
tions.-
The second prong requires the manufacturer to prove that it
conformed to the product specifications. "[A] product conforms to
reasonably precise specifications if it satisfies 'an intended configura-
tion' even if it 'may produce unintended and unwanted results.'" 5
On a motion for summary judgment, conformity may be established
by showing that the government accepted the product and deter-
mined that it complied with the contract specifications.5 Even an
49 Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1486 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A
mere rubber stamp by a federal procurement officer does not constitute approval
and does not give rise to the government contractor defense."); see also Stout v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1991) (determining that mean-
ingful review of relevant design features is required to invoke the defense); cf
Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Co., 911 F. Supp. 1460, 1468 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (stating
that contractor had "considerable discretion" in formulating components).
50 Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir. 1995).
61 Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Shawv. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 745 (1lth Cir. 1985));
see also Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 125 F.3d 1371, 1377-78 (11th Cir.
1997) (rejecting defense and explaining that reasonably precise specification re-
quirement means that federal officer had discretion over significant details and
critical design choices).
52 Id.
53 See In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570, 574 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("The first two elements of the test ensure that the Government, and not
the contractor, is exercising discretion in selecting the design."), modified on denial
of reh'g, Perez v. Lockheed Corp., 88 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub. nom
Chase v. Lockheed Corp., 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996).
See In re Aircraft Crash Litig. Frederick, Md., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1342 (S.D.
Ohio 1990) ("The principal issue for this Court is not who 'designed' the particular
features... but whether the Air Force approved specifications for those features
which were reasonably precise").
Kleeman, 890 F.2d at 703 (quoting Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878
F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989)).
See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1126 (3d Cir. 1993). In In re Air-
craft Crash Litigation Frederick, Md., plaintiff claimed that the aircraft was not sub-
jected to sufficiently rigorous testing, an interesting species of defectiveness. See 752
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alleged manufacturing defect may be protected if the contractor can
demonstrate that the government approved the method of manufac-
ture.57 "However, if a defect is the result of shoddy contractor work-
manship, no federal interest justifies an immunity from liability."'"
Moreover, whether to characterize a defect as design or manufactur-
ing is determined by federal common law rather than state law for
the purposes of determining the applicability of the defense.'" The
conformity of the product must be established as to the particular
feature claimed to be defective.60
Because of the third prong's prophylactic aspects, 61 courts re-
quire "a substantial showing that the manufacturer informed the
F. Supp. at 1855. The court held that the testing schedule was the result of collabo-
ration between the military and the contractor and thus satisfied Boyle. See id. How-
ever, reordering and continuing to use a defectively manufactured product does not
satisfy this prong. See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1378-79.
See Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that even if metallurgic content of bellows canister aboard Phantom II F-
4D jet fighter is characterized as a manufacturing defect, government contractor
defense may apply if the metallurgic content conformed to government specifica-
tions); see also Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1491-92 n.8 (C.D.
Cal. 1993). The government contractor defense may protect a manufacture from
liability for a manufacturing defect where the government might incur passed-on
cost of liability as a result of an approved manufacturing process. See id. The state
secrets privilege may protect a manufacturer from liability for a manufacturing de-
fect where the government has an interest in nondisclosure of the manufacturing
process. See id. Compare McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that government contractor defense does not apply "to the
military contractor that mismanufactures military equipment").
Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 1990).
9 See Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir.
1989) ("The government contractor defense is a matter of federal common law, and
so is the denomination of a defect as one of design or manufacture for purposes of
applying the defense. Were this not so, state law could operate either to defeat the
defense or to expand it improperly"); cf Mitchell, 913 F.2d at 247 n.10 ("In this
Court's opinion, the relevant inquiry is the degree of manufacturer's responsibility
for the defect in question. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit in Harduvel recognized the
validity of this inquiry").
W See Bailey, 989 F.2d at 801 n.15 ("[W]e note that where the government speci-
fications are silent with respect to the particular feature in issue, Boyle's first condi-
tion-government approved reasonably precise specifications-would probably be in
issue if the defense were applied to that feature"); Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985
F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1993) (examining reasonably precise specifications for the
de sn feature in question).
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988) ("We adopt this
provision lest our effort to protect discretionary functions perversely impede them
by cutting off information highly relevant to the discretionary decision,"); see also In
re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 1996)
("The third element is necessary to eliminate any incentive that this defense may
create for contractors to withhold knowledge of risks").
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government of known risks in the use of its product."6 2 Summary
judgment is appropriate where evidence establishes one of the fol-
lowing: the government possessed "at least as much information on
the dangers,"6" the government "had first hand and superior knowl-
edge of the problems,"64 or there is no evidence that the manufac-
turer knew of any dangers associated with the product." Where the
government has reordered the manufactured product with knowl-
edge of an alleged defect, the defense applies even if the defect was
not identified during the design phase.6 Importantly, the duty to
warn the government under Boyle's third prong is conceptually sepa-
rate from any state-law products liability claim based on failure to
warn product users.6'
III. THE BREADTH OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. When Does a Significant Conflict Exist Between an Identifiable
Federal Policy or Interest and the Operation of State Law?
The Boyle Court explained when displacement of state law in fa-
vor of federal interests is appropriate:
Displacement will occur only where, as we have variously de-
scribed, a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable
"federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law," or
the application of state law would "frustrate specific objectives" of
federal legislation."
Boyle did not make clear, however, whether the defense it rec-
ognized as displacing state product liability law was a "government
2 Carleyv. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1127 (3d Cir. 1993).3 Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (D. Kan. 1996).
64 McCoy v. Unisys Corp., No. CIV.A.H-95-1487, 1996 WL 186085, at *5 (S.D.
Tex.Jan. 16, 1996).
See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 577 (5th Cir. 1985).
66 See, e.g., Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
the government's reorder of cable for fighterjet after initiating a corrosion study).
See Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1995) ('Warning
the government of dangers arising from a specific design-the third condition of
Byle--does not encompass or state a failure to warn claim; it simply encourages
contractors to provide the government with all the information required to soundly
exercise its discretion"); In reJoint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626,
631 (2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that defense may be satisfied as to design defect
while leaving manufacturer exposed for failure to warn under state law); see also
June E. Wagner, Note, Tate v. Boeing Helicopters: Government Contractors Increas-
ingly At Risk Despite the Government Contractors Defense, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 377, 389 &
n.87 (1995).




contractor defense" or a "military contractor defense." Justice Bren-
nan both warned and predicted in his Boyle dissent:
Worse yet, the injustice will extend far beyond the facts of this
case, for the Court's newly discovered Government contractor de-
fense is breathtakingly sweeping. It applies not only to military
equipment... but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-order
gadget that the Federal Government might purchase after pre-
viewing plans .... 69
The Court's ambiguity was manifest. On one hand, the Court
relied on cases outside the military context to identify the unique
federal interests served by the defense and seemed to imply broadly
that harm to discretionary decisions in "Government procurement"
were at risk without the defense." On the other hand, the Court also
suggested that the discretionary interests to be protected were
uniquely military:
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discre-
tionary function within the meaning of this provision.... In
sum, we are of the view that state law which holds Government
contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does
in some circumstances present a "significant conflict" with federal
policy and must be displaced.
In addition, when announcing the three-part test, the Court
specifically referred to the defense's application to "military equip-
ment."73 Significantly, while the Court suggested that the "outlines
of" and "potential for" the defense were rooted in the discretionary
function, the Court also implied that its "scope" was narrowly lim-
ited to military equipment. '
However, by specifically rejecting the Feres"6 doctrine as the intel-
lectual underpinning of the defense, and instead grounding the de-
69 Id. at 516 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
10 See id. at 505-07. The Court cited, for example, Yearslky v. W.A. Ross Construe-
tion Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940), which found no contractor liability for damage
caused in construction of a government dam.71 See id!. at 511.
72 Id. at511-12.
73 Seeid. at 512.
14 See Boy/e, 487 U.S. at 511.
15 See id. at 512.
16 The Feres doctrine prevents suits for injuries to armed services personnel in
the course of military service, holding that the government's sovereign immunity is
not waived with respect to servicemen's injuries arising out of activities incident to
their service. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). The scope of the
Feres doctrine expanded in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
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fense in the broad discretionary function of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the Court invited application of the defense beyond the military
arena.7 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States does
not waive sovereign immunity for "claim [s] ... based upon the exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."78 By its terms, the discretionary function provision is not
limited to the military but applies broadly to the exercise of discre-
tion by federal employees or federal agencies.
1. Does Boyle Prevent An Economic Detriment or Permit
an Economic Windfall?
The competing policies at stake that defined the schism be-
tween the Boyle majority and dissent continue to boil among the cir-
cuits. The Boyle majority feared that without the defense, an inap-
propriate economic burden would be passed on to the government
in the form of higher prices for products or, as an extreme conse-
quence, that products would become unavailable because the costs
of risk were too great.79 The Court explained that imposing liability
on its contractor defeated the economic advantage the government
(1977), where the Court held that a third party has no right to recover in an action
for indemnity against the United States for damages it may be required to pay to
injured servicemen. See StencelAero, 431 U.S. at 674.
The Boyle Court rejected Feres as the source of the defense because it was, at
once, too broad and too narrow. The Court explained, as to its unreasonable
broadness: "Since Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Govern-
ment, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort
claims against the manufacturer-making inexplicable the three limiting criteria
for contractor immunity .... " Boye, 487 U.S. at 510. As to Feres's unreasonable
narrowness, the Court explained, "it could not be invoked to prevent, for example,
a civilian's suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort the-
ory...." d. at5l10-11.
77 On occasion, manufacturers produce defense products pursuant to an official
government order issued under the Defense Production Act. It is usually invoked
as a method of mobilizing private companies to the production of essential materi-
als for a military effort. In such a case, the contractors are entitled to some immuni-
ties as yet undetermined in scope. See Hercules Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981,
989 n.14 (1996) ("We need not decide the scope of § 707 [of the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950] in this case because it clearly functions only as an immunity, and
provides no hint of a further agreement to indemnify"). The Boyle defense is sepa-
rate and more generally applicable.
7s 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
79 See Boye, 487 U.S. at 511-12; see alsoJoel Slawotsky, The Expansion of the Gov-
ernment Contractor Defense, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 929, 945 (1996) ('The view that the
government contractor defense is limited solely to military equipment is not com-
patible with the rationale for the defense").
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derived from its discretionary immunity. "It makes little sense to in-
sulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment
that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the
Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it con-
tracts for the production."' On the other hand, Justice Brennan ar-
gued that the Court's economic justifications for the defense were
not compelling in military contracts or otherwise and that any rule of
law in this context and however fashioned should be made by Con-
gress.8' Justice Brennan concluded that the indirect burdens of
passed-on costs have not traditionally been the basis for shielding
third parties from liabilityi2
Despite the dissent's premise that the burden of indirect costs
on the government do not ever compel excusing the contractor, the
case for a narrow military contractor defense is justifiable."5 Judicial
deference to military and national-defense decisions is well-rooted in
judicial opinions." Although the majority could not "prove" that
some contractors would otherwise refuse work out of fear of liability,
go Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
a] See id. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Barry Keliman, Judicial Abdica-
tion of Militaty Tort Accountability: But Who Is To Guard The Guards. Themselves?, 1989
DuKE LJ. 1597, 1647-48 (1989) (criticizing Boyle and arguing that the courts have
abdicated their judicial responsibility to review civil matters involving the military).
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o authority for the
proposition that burdens imposed on Government contractors, but passed on to the
Government, burden the Government in a way thatjustifies extension of its immu-
nity").
This is not to say that soldiers' lives are less valuable. As one court stated:
Young servicemen.. . represent the very best of our Nation's citizens.
Americans take pride in their bravery and skill, and mourn when their
lives are tragically lost. The pilots and crews of military aircraft will-
ingly embrace the risks that they assume by volunteering to serve our
country. They are not the "military doubles of civilian motorists," or
ordinary purchasers of consumer products.... Although the defense
may sometimes seem harsh in its operation, it is a necessary conse-
quence of the incompatibility of modem products liability law and the
exigencies of national defense.
Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (opining that court
should "hesitate long" before interfering in chain of command); Gilligan v. Mor-
gan, 413 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973) (noting reluctance to interfere with National Guard
decision concerning equipping, staffing, and training military force); Doe v. Sulli-
van, 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ('[Deference is owed to the political
branches in military matters").
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 527 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Even granting the Court's
factual premise, which is by no means self-evident, the Court cites no authority for
the proposition that burdens imposed on Government contractors... justifies ex-
tension of its immunity").
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or that costs would make weaponry unavailable, the unproven fear
alone justifies the defense in light of traditional judicial deference to
military matters." In addition, military weaponry and equipment are
often necessarily dangerous to soldiers and civilians. The line be-
tween defective and effective blurs when one considers basic military
purposes. The prospect of liability for the manufacture of military
weaponry and equipment may pose staggering liability risks in light
of the intended military purposes the products serve.8 Finally, the
risk of public revelations about the manufacture of military equip-
ment associated with product-liability lawsuits could conceivably
jeopardize national defense and security." Of note, although Boyle
involved an injury to a soldier, when the defense is invoked-even if
it is limited to military equipment-it precludes injured civilians as
well as soldiers from recovering compensation for injuries."
Outside of the military arena, the prospect that a product may
be unavailable or cost more because of risks associated with its use
raises significantly less compelling concerns. The availability and
price of an item is a normal, common, and hardly unique federal in-
terest. Put simply, the threat of an increased economic burden is
unpersuasive." In fact, Boyle failed to recognize that the government
8 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (administration of [SD
to soldier); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (failure to control danger-
ous soldier). But see Kevin J. Dalton, Comment, Gulf War Syndrome: Will the Injuries of
Veterans and TheirFamilies Be Redressed?, 25 U. BALT. L. REv. 179, 201-08 (1996); Mary
J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FoREsr L. REv.
1075, 1096 (1996) (questioning economic impact of absence of the defense); Kell-
man, supra note 81, at 1603-04.
Justice Brennan expressed skepticism that the unavailability of weaponry was
the majority's overriding concern. Instead, he viewed the defense as economically
based. "The erosion [of discretion] the Court fears apparently is rooted not in a
concern that suits against Government contractors will prevent them from design-
ing, or the Government from commissioning the design of, precisely the product
the Government wants, but in the concern that such suits might preclude the Gov-
ernment from purchasing the desired product at the price it wants .... " Boy/e, 487
U.S. at 527 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
See Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-96 (C.D. Cal.
1993) (noting the government's assertion of state-secrets privilege, invoked because
disclosure would be harmful to national security, precluded adjudication of manu-
facturing-defect claim against manufacturer of missile that malfunctioned during
Persian Gulf War).
See In re Aircraft Crash Litig. Frederick, Md., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1336 (S.D.
Ohio 1990) (explaining that, in case of civilians injured in military aircraft, defense
applies to "claims brought against military contractors by or on behalf of civilians").
SeeJack M. Sabatino, Pivatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign's Immunities From Exemplary Damages?. 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 238-39
(1997) (noting deterrence effect and urging that government contractors not be
shielded from punitive damage awards).
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suffers substantial economic consequences as a result of a faulty de-
sign that it cannot recover elsewhere.9' Thus, outside the military,
the generally accepted tort goals of safer product design, deterrence,
and compensation serve the federal government just as aptly as they
serve the general marketplace.
There is a facile attractiveness to the argument that it is unfair
to impose the economic burden of tort liability upon the manufac-
turer when a culpable government tortfeasor is immune from suit.
2
After all, the product was manufactured at the behest of the gov-
ernment, with government design approval, and some alleged gov-
ernment fault.9 The apparent unfairness arises because federal law
prevents the manufacturer from recovering these costs from the gov-
ernment at the end of the lawsuit through contribution or indem-
nity."
It is not particularly unique, however, that one tortfeasor is insu-
lated from liability for one reason or another while the other shoul-
9' For example, in the case of a fatal injury to a pilot, among other things
(including loss of morale and public confidence), the government loses its human
resource, its investment in training, and the aircraft. It also bears the cost of the vet-
eran or worker compensation claim. A catastrophic civilian accident also costs the
government when it serves as the "safety net" for medical and social services to the
disabled. The outcome, therefore, is that while the manufacturer is able to avoid
paying damages, the government still pays for damages outside of tort, and the vic-
tim is inadequately compensated.
See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990)
("It would be inherently unfair to expose a manufacturer to liability for a defective
design that the Government not only specified, but knew was defective").9 See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1478 (5th Cir. 1989)
(the purpose of the defense is to "prevent the contractor from being held liable
when the government is actually at fault").
The government is immune from suit because the officers exercised discre-
tion in the approval of the design and thus the United States has not waived its sov-
ereign immunity. Therefore, no contribution can be had against the government
as a joint tortfeasor. In addition, the government cannot generally indemnify its
contractors under the Anti-Deficiency Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1) (1983 &
Supp. 1997) ("[Officer or employee of the United States Government... may not
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available
in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or (B) involve either
government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appro-
priation is made unless authorized by law"); Hercules Inc. v. United States, 116 S.
Ct. 981, 985, 987 (1996) (determining that Agent Orange manufacturers may not
recover from the federal government for tort settlement with injured victims be-
cause no express or implied-in-fact indemnity provisions are permitted to cover
manufacturer's liability in tort to claimants); Wagner, supra note 67, at 406-07
(noting unfairness). If a manufacturer breaches its contract to the government, it
remains liable to the government for its design defects. See Mark S. Jaeger, Contrac-
tor Liability for Design Defects Under the Inspection Clause: Latent Design Defects-A Sleep-
ing Giant?, 21 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 331, 331-32 (1991).
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ders the burden despite an apparent unfairness. 95 worker compen-
sation law, for example, provides an instance where one tortfeasor is
immune from suit despite its fault.98 Generally, an employer bears
no tort liability in exchange for modest worker protection for work-
place injuries without regard to fault. The employer's immunity
from suit often forces the manufacturer to absorb the lion's share of
tort liability, but that burden" has not resulted in the repeal of
worker compensation laws.98 Somewhat similarly, under traditional
joint and several liability tort law, it is common for deep-pocket tort-
feasors to bear a disproportionate share of damages apportioned to
other tortfeasors. In short, tort law has always been imperfect in its
allocations among tortfeasors; however, it remains superior to leav-
ing the risk to the injured victim." Placing a disproportionate share
of liability on the manufacturer is not inconsistent with tort out-
comes generally.
95 Under the current tort system, it is not unfair to ask the manufacturer to
shoulder the cost of injuries regardless of its negligence. The concept that the
manufacturer is best able to internalize such external costs as personal injury is the
premise of strict liability. See supra note 7 for citation to authorities examining de-
terrence and compensation goals of risk allocation through tort liability.
In cases involving federal employees, the government enjoys protection un-
der federal worker compensation law, which is the employees' exclusive remedy. See
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8116(c), 8173 (1996).
97 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 530 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
" Under state workers' compensation laws, for example, the em-
ployer/tortfeasor cannot be sued by the employee, and in the majority of states, ab-
sent an express indemnity agreement, the employer cannot be liable to a third party
seeking contribution or indemnity. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Shuwa Inv. Corp., 825 F.
Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1993); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Superior Court, 258 Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989); Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Del., 269 A.2d 52 (Del.
1970); Kamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 504 P.2d 861 (Haw. 1972); Harter Concrete
Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979); Tsarnas v.Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 412 A.2d 1094 (Pa. 1980); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co.,
588 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1978); cf. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679,
684, 689 (Minn. 1977) (it may seem unfair to require a third party to "bear the bur-
den of a full common-lawjudgment despite possibly greater fault on the part of the
employer" and permitting contribution "not to exceed its total workers' compensa-
tion liability to plaintiff"). See general!yJoel E. Smith, Annotation, Modern Status of
Effect of State Workmen's Compensation Act on Right of Third-Person Tortfeasor to Contribu-
tion or Indemnity From Employer of Injured or Kiled Workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350 (1980).
Expecting the federal government to pay a fixed sum for risk at the outset of the
contract does not defeat sovereign-immunity principles. Sovereign immunity is de-
feated, however, by forcing the government to defend against expost losses.
Justice Brennan argued in Boyle that even if "tort liability is an inefficient
means of ensuring the quality of design efforts," it was for Congress, not the Court,
to reconfigure tort policy. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 530 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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Boyle correctly assumed that contractors who may suffer later li-
ability will pass on the cost of that risk to the government ex ante. As
the Boyle Court noted, incorporating the cost of liability into the
product undermines the economic advantage the government would
enjoy if it made the product itself and asserted its immunity from
suit in defense of liability claims after the fact.'1 ° However, paying
the cost of potential injuries through passed-on costs or paying for
redesign of the product is not necessarily an unfavorable outcome.' °'
Furthermore, rather than comparing the effect of manufacturing the
product in-house as opposed to out-sourcing, the Court in Boyle
could have as easily focused on the illogical effect of granting the de-
fense to manufacturers working from government specifications
when no such immunity results for defective off-the-rack purchased
goods. As one jurist pointed out, the price of every commercially
available product the government purchases carries the attendant
costs of potential product-liability exposure. The government pays
the manufacturer's contingent liability as part of the sticker price in
an off-the-rack purchase. There is little justification for the defense's
economic benefit to the government when the government is at fault
considering that it pays these costs when it is faultless:
Indeed, the cost theory relied on by the majority proves too
much, for every time the government purchases a product made
in the private sector, potential liability costs (factored into the
price) are passed on to the government. While I agree with the
majority that "[tihe government would suffer this economic
harm regardless of whether it procured a product for military or
civilian use," the likelihood that the government will bear indi-
rectly the liability costs of the products it procures from the pri-
100 See id. at 512. Even when the government manufactures a product in-house,
however, the risk is not "costless." As discussed supra, note 91, the government loses
its human and product investment and pays for injuries outside of the tort compen-
sation system.
101 See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1131 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J.,
concurring and dissenting); cf. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Product Li-
ability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 506 (1993)
(endorsing fault-based product liability principles). See generally Ronald A. Cass &
Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public
Risk, 77 VA. L. 11Ev. 257 (1991); Kellman, supra note 81; Schwartz, supra note 7, at
412 ("[A]t the least, liability has accelerated safety: tort verdicts have led manufac-
turers to immediately implement design changes that would have probably been
implemented at later dates"); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A
Modest Proposa 72 CHL-KENT L. REv. 189 (1996) (endorsing risk/loss-spreading
function of products liability law).
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vate sector does not justify the displacement of state law with a
sweeping rule of federal common law.'02
The illogic of the defense thus compared is apparent. When
the government buys something "off-the-rack" it pays for the risks of
defective design even though the government has no fault and did
not participate in the design. Yet the government contractor de-
fense shields the manufacturer and protects the government from
those risk-spreading costs when the government did have a hand in
the design and is at fault. When the economic harm is measured
from the government's perspective, the defense makes little sense.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to apply Boyle judiciously
derives from the decision to use a tort system to compensate victims
injured by defective products. A fundamental principle of the tort
system is that risk of injury should be borne by those with the best
ability to manage the risk by safeguarding against injury or bearing
its cost.' 3 In this instance, the least appropriate party upon whom to
place the risk of loss for a design defect (among the government, the
manufacturer, and the victim) is the victim.'04 Yet this is where the
102 Carley, 991 F.2d at 1132 (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).
103 AsJustice Brennan observed, dissenting in Boyl .
The tort system is premised on the assumption that the imposition of
liability encourages actors to prevent any injury whose expected cost
exceeds the cost of prevention. If the system is working as it should,
Government contractors will design equipment to avoid certain inju-
ries (like the deaths of soldiers or Government employees), which
would be certain to burden the Government. The Court therefore has
no basis for its assumption that tort liability will result in a net burden
on the Government (let alone a clearly excessive net burden) rather
than a net gain.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 530 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also Owen, supra note 101, at 488-
92; Wertheimer, supra note 101, at 192-93 n.15 (arguing that purpose of strict liabil-
ity is to spread cost of injuries more than to encourage development of safer prod-
ucts). See generally RobertJ. Staaf & Bruce Yandle, Common Law, Statute Law, and Li-
ability Rules, in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILrTy RuLES: IN DEFENSE OF
COMMON LAW LIABILrrY 11 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1991)
[hereinafter COMMON LAw LIABtxn]; Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an In-
surance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985); Rabin, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra
note 7, at 443; Garry T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Mod-
em American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
104 Boyle is particularly onerous to tort victims not employed by the federal gov-
ernment. For example, federal employees enjoy some recovery for work-related in-
juries under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193
(1996 & Supp. 1997), and veterans enjoy some recovery under the Veterans' Bene-
fits Act, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-8527 (1991 & Supp. 1997). Victims not employed by
the federal government, however, receive no such protection. See generally
Wertheimer, supra note 101, at 198 (injured victim is the least appropriate loss-
bearer in product liability cases). If defectively designed government equipment
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Boyle decision places that burden of risk. Boyle displaced tort law and
left nothing in its stead to fill the gaping hole.
Finally, the Court's concern that the manufacturer might pass
on the cost of the risk of liability to the government and thereby
erode the discretionary function is not well conceived considering
government-procurement practices generally. The government has
often been willing to bear certain risks through pricing under its
contracts. In construction work, contractors build in the costs of in-
surance, performance bonds, and other risks into every government
contract.'05 The government has traditionally been willing to fairly
allocate risks associated with construction work through its procure-
ment laws.'06 Allocating the risk of third-party liability can be accom-
plished without thwarting sovereign immunity by pricing products to
reflect a0 roduct's true price-including the cost of injury to third
persons.
2. Does Boyle Protect or Undermine the Federal Officer's
Exercise of Discretion?
Boyle's second justification for the defense, preserving the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting a federal officer's discretionary acts,
is also diminished outside of military procurement. As the Court
noted in Boyle, the design of military equipment "often involves
... the balancing of many technical, military, and even social consid-
erations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety
injures nonfederal civilians, there is no source from which to recover at all. See
Margaret M. Severson, Defense Industiy- Injured Parties-O: Rights-Limiting Ethical
Problems with Boyle and the Government Contractor Defense, 21 PuB. CONT. L.J. 572, 588-
92 (1992) (suggesting that Boyle results in an unfair outcome for victims).105 See GEORGE EDSON MASON, A QUANTITATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH To
THE SELECTION OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT PROVISIONS 28-32 (1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review)
(noting that government recognizes that risk is best assigned to the party who can
best manage the risk); Raymond E. Levitt et al., Allocating Risk and Incentive in Con-
struction, 106 J. CONSTRUCTION DVIISION 297, 298-99 (1980) (noting United States
Department of Transportation concern that misallocation of construction risks
upon contractors may interfere with ability to construct).
106 See Carl A. Erikson et al., Preliminary Investigations of Risk Sharing In Con-
struction Contracts 16 (U.S. Army Construction Eng'g Research Lab. Apr. 1978)
(Rep. No. CERIAR-P-88) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review) (observing that
government contracts reflect allocation of risks between government and contrac-
tor); Gene Ming Lee, A Case For Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1075, 1115-21 (1996) (arguing that government should bear unforeseen risks
in public works contracts); Severson, supra note 104, at 589 (stating that, prior to
Boyle, government willingly accepted pass-through costs).107 See Davis, supra note 86, at 1097 (opining Boyle ignores the "greater costs in
human life and limb" of product liability).
1997]
SETON HALL LA WREVEW [Vol. 28:430
and greater combat effectiveness."' 8 Put simply, national security
and defense interests are far more compelling than other federal in-
terests." What purpose, outside of national security, justifies deny-
ing compensation to a victim when a government officer and a
manufacturer together determine to forsake public safety in order to
secure a cheaper product?"
The Boyle test indulges the fiction that federal officers engage in
informed risk-benefit analysis (including the cost of human injury)
associated with design and procurement of manufactured goods.
However, while Boyle assures that contractors will reveal all known
risks to the government, Boyle provides no incentive for federal offi-
cers to engage in a risk-benefit analysis because, under Boyle, the cost
of injury is not a risk factor that needs to be considered in pricing or
design."' A non-military government officer would engage in a more
informed risk-benefit analysis if forced to choose whether to pay for
the risk of injury through the passed-on costs of anticipated litigation
or the passed-on costs of product redesign. By considering external
costs associated with personal injury, the federal officer actually en-
gages in informed discretionary approval of specifications for de-
signs. Instead, Boyle allows the federal officer to ignore external costs
108 BoyL, 487 U.S. at 511; see also Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp.
1486, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that where war-time national interests are at
stake, the government often makes trade-offs between product quality, price, and
time of production); Dalton, supra note 86, at 228 (arguing that veterans should be
better compensated by government for Gulf War Syndrome, but recognizing that
the Feres doctrine is necessary to prevent judicial interference with military effec-
tiveness).
109 See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1131 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
110 See Davis, supra note 86, at 1098 (claiming that the government contractor de-
fense overprotects discretionary function).
I Two pre-Boyle cases demonstrate factually why Boyle is particularly and
uniquely appropriate in military equipment cases. In Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982), a reservist sued for injuries suffered when operating a
bulldozer that lacked a canopy or roll bar. The court explained that the military
desired a completely unobstructed view as a combat function and intended that a
rifle case could be mounted on the bulldozer. See id. at 254-55. In Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (App. Div. 1976), plaintiff suffered injuries
when a "jeep" without a roll bar or seat belts overturned. The army viewed seat belts
as deterring "egress and escape in tactical situations as well as enhancing injuries in
the event of a roll-over." Id. at 6, 364 A.2d at 45-46. Likewise, the roll bar
.compromised some of the intended uses of the vehicle." Id., 364 A.2d at 46.
These cases demonstrate the sort of risk-benefit analysis that is justifiably indulged
and protected by Boyle in the military context.
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without recognizing their impact on the federal government and the
public.
1 2
B. The Ninth Circuit: Significant Conflict Between State and Federal
Procurement Law Only Exists With Regard To Military Equipment
Following Boyle, the Ninth Circuit carefully weighed Boyle's gov-
ernmental and economic policy considerations against important
state-law interests served by tort liability and held that the govern-
ment contractor defense adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Boyle is inapplicable outside of military contracts.'" It did so
by reading Boyle to require a threshold inquiry as to the significance
of the conflict between the federal interests at risk and state law prior
to mechanically applying Boyle's three-part test. It created still
greater distance from its sister circuits when it declined to find such
conflict even within the military context unless the item was manu-
"14factured principally for a military, and not commercial, purpose.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that Boyle only applies in
failure-to-warn cases where compliance with government specifica-
tions precluded the manufacturer's compliance with state-law duties
to warn or substantially conflicted with those state-law duties." 5
These rulings properly assure narrow application of Boyle. They also
signal the Ninth Circuit's general willingness to respect state tort
law's role in determining the conduct of private parties.
Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co.'" demonstrates the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning. In Nielsen, Ronald Nielsen, a civilian em-
ployee of the Army Corps of Engineers, filed suit against the manu-
11 See supra note 91 for a discussion of why Boyle allows a federal officer to ig-
nore external costs without recognizing their impact on the federal government
and the public.
1 The Second Circuit has not decided whether the defense is applicable outside
the military. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339, 349-51 (Bankr. S.D.NY.
1992) (holding that the defense is inapplicable to manufacturer of postal vehicle),
ruling questioned in later proceedings, 201 B.R. 48, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating
that applicability of Boyle to nonmilitary contracts is undecided in Second Circuit-
but noting trend toward nonmilitary applicability). The Second Circuit has, how-
ever, found the defense applicable in shipyard asbestos exposure cases. See In re
Brooklyn NavyYard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 839 (2d Cir. 1992). This ruling is
at odds with In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
1 See Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 812-13 (concluding that asbestos in-
sulation used in the manufacture of naval ships was not subject to military contrac-
tor defense because the same insulation was marketed to other commercial buyers
and was not manufactured with the special needs of the military in mind).
11" Seeid. at813.
16 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
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facturers of paint he used during the course of painting a dam."'
Nielsen alleged that paint exposure resulted in disabling physical
and psychiatric symptoms. He was eventually diagnosed as suffering
"solvent-induced brain damage.""8 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the manufacturers, concluding that the
design of the paint and its warnings were the result of United States
Government specifications and they were therefore protected from
suit under Idaho state law."' The case provided the Ninth Circuit its
first opportunity to apply Boyle, which was decided between the dis-
trict court decision and the appellate decision in Nielsen.
The appellate court concluded that Boyle had no applicability
beyond the manufacture of military equipment. The court rejected
the argument that the Supreme Court's rejection of the Feres-Stencel
doctrine as a basis for immunity and its reliance of the Federal Tort
Claims Act expanded the government contractor defense to poten-
tially all government contracts. The Ninth Circuit narrowly held that
although Boyle delineated the outlines of the defense as the discre-
tionary function immunity of federal employees, the scope of the
displacement was limited to instances where military objectives could
be undermined by an imposition of state law.'2 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the defendant's argument that Boyle's broad reliance on dis-
cretion and rejection of the Feres-Stencel doctrine as the underpin-
ning of the government contractor defense mandated broad appli-
cability beyond the military
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle altered the
scope of the so-called "military contractor defense" available as a
matter of federal law in diversity actions against military contrac-
tors; it also changed the intellectual mooring of that defense
from the Feres doctrine to the discretionary function exemption
of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Yet the policy behind the defense
remains rooted in considerations peculiar to the military.'2
The court declined to hold that every time the discretionary
function of the Federal Tort Claims Act is implicated in the initial
decisions between contractor and officer the contractor should enjoy
immunity. Instead, the Ninth Circuit examined Boyle's underlying
policies and concluded that the imposition of state-law liability in
this instance would not "create a 'significant conflict' with federal
11 Seeid. at 145L
Ila Id.
119 See id.
120 See id. at 1454.
12 Id. at 1454-55.
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policy."'2 "[W]e deal with a civilian worker injured in the course of a
civilian job involving a product designed to further civilian, rather
than military, objectives." 2 1 In fact, the Ninth Circuit went so far as
to call the Boyle defense the "military contractor defense," eschewing
the broader "government contractor defense" denomination.24
After Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit revisited Boyle in the context of
asbestos injuries suffered by Naval shipyard workers and limited the
defense even further. In In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases,2 the pro-
duction of Navy ships was unquestionably performed under a con-
tract with the military, and the ships would qualify as military equip-
ment. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
application of Boyle was "consistent with the purposes the Court as-
cribes to that defense."26 Without reaching Boyle's three-part inquiry,
the court concluded as a threshold matter that no federal interests
were sufficiently in conflict with state law to justify displacement of
state tort law.'2
The court focused particularly on asbestos's commercial appli-
cations beyond the military. The court noted that the military was a
"relatively insignificant purchaser of [asbestos] products that were
primarily designed for applications by private industry."1 28 The court
reasoned that because these "were not specialized items of military
equipment but were, instead, goods sold on the ordinary commercial
market," the defense should not shield the manufacturer, even if the
product was designed to federal specifications.'29
Just as Boylejustified the existence of the defense upon potential
economic harm to the government, In re Hawaii Asbestos Cases justi-
fied the rejection of the defense on the basis that neither the gov-
ernment nor the manufacturer suffered any economic harm without
the defense in this case.1$0
122 Nishn, 892 F.2d at 1455.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 1454.
125 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
12 Id. at8ll.
127 See id. at 812.
128 Id.
M Se id.
ISO The government often sells its old merchandise as surplus and places these
products into the stream of commerce. Unbeknownst to the purchasing public,
these products lack the state-law product liability protections of other merchandise.
The defense, therefore, has far-reaching effects on ordinary consumers uncon-
nected with any federal activities. In addition, when the federal government sells
products as surplus and the consumer cannot look to either the manufacturer or
the government for product-liability recovery, both the manufacturer and the gov-
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The products have not been developed on the basis of involved
judgments made by the military but in response to the broader
needs and desires of end-users in the private sector. The contrac-
tors, furthermore, already will have factored the costs of ordinary
tort liability into the price of their goods. That the contractors
will not enjoy immunity from tort liability with respect to the
goods sold to one of their customers, the Government, is unlikely
to affect their marketing behavior or their pricing.""
The Ninth Circuit's decisions reflect adherence to both the test
and the policies underlying Boyle. As the next section demonstrates,
by focusing their attention only upon the Boyle test, other circuits
have forsaken the underlying principles at stake.
C. Applying Boyle in Nonmilitary Cases
1. The Design and Manufacture of the United States
Postal Service's Multiple Position Letter Sorting
Machine
Other jurisdictions liberally extend the government contractor
defense to nonmilitary contractors.1 3 2 In this section, the application
emment enjoy an unfair commercial advantage not available to other manufactur-
ers. Cf Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 644 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying
recovery to civilian who purchased surplus leather tree-trimming belt originally
manufactured for the military); Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d
977, 980 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying recovery to insurer as subrogee of owner of for-
mer military helicopter sold as surplus and operated by civilian pilot during a sub-
sequent logging operation).
1 Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 811. Cf Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a shipboard ladder is military
eq ui ment conforming to extremely precise specifications).
SUs.PSummarizing the defense's status in the circuits: No courts in the First Cir-
cuit have ruled whether the defense extends to nonmilitary products. While, the
Second Circuit has not ruled definitively, it has implied that military interests are
unique. See Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1993) (calling it
the "military contractor defense"). On the other hand, the Second Circuit has ap-
plied the defense to Navy shipyard asbestos exposure, suggesting its disagreement
with the Ninth Circuit. See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831,
839 (2d Cir. 1992). A lower court in the Second Circuit has suggested the defense
is applicable outside the military context. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339,
349-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding the defense is inapplicable to manufacturer
of postal vehicle-as well as outside the military context in general), ruling ques-
tioned in later proceedings, 201 B.R. 48, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that appli-
cability of Boyle to nonmilitary contracts is undecided in the Second Circuit-but
noting trend toward nonmilitary applicability). The Third Circuit has ruled that
the defense is available to nonmilitary contractors. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach,
991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit has also applied Boyle to
nonmilitary contractors. See Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1448
(4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the defense shields contractor from state-law claim
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of the defense to the manufacture of one product for the United
States Postal Service illustrates the danger of construing Boyle
broadly.
Numerous postal workers across the country working at Multiple
Position Letter Sorting Machines (MPLSM) for the United States
Postal Service have filed suits against Unisys Corporation, the succes-
sor to Burroughs Corporation, alleging that the ergonomic design
defects of the MPLSMs caused injuries to their hands, wrists, and
arms such as repetitive-stress injury, carpal tunnel syndrome, numb-
for libel and slander during government investigation); Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp.,
962 F. Supp. 710, 711 (D. Md. 1997) (holding government contractor defense ap-
plicable to nonmilitary contracts); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Adas Proper-
ties, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 421-23 (D.S.C. 1994) (determining that defense applies
to landowner claim against clean-up company doing work for the EPA). The Fifth
Circuit has not yet ruled on the precise issue, but language in cases suggest it rec-
ognizes a military contractor defense. See Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331,
334 (5th Cir. 1991) (extending defense to "military equipment"). On the other
hand, a lower court within the Fifth Circuit extended the defense to a nonmilitary
service contract. See Guillory v. Ree's Contract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 346
(S.D. Miss. 1994). Similarly, a lower court within the Sixth Circuit applied Boyle to a
service contract for the operation of a uranium plant. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy Sys., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966 (W.D. Ky. 1993). Even prior to Boye, the Seventh
Circuit extended the defense to nonmilitary contracts. See Boruski v. United States,
803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (relying on state law); see also Johnson v.
Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 217 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (applying defense to case
involving postal vehicle). A lower court in the Eighth Circuit applied Boyle to non-
military contracts. See Schmid v. Unisys Corp., No. 4:95CV00864, 1996 WL 421843,
at *17 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 1996). Lower courts within the Tenth Circuit have also
extended the defense to nonmilitary contracts. See Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F.
Supp. 821, 829-30 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (holding government contractor defense ap-
plicable to manufacture of letter-sorting machine for United States Postal Service);
Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1501, 1509 (D. Kan. 1996) (applying govern-
ment contractor defense to nonmilitary contracts). The Eleventh Circuit ruled
prior to Boyle that the defense extends to nonmilitary contractors. See Burgess v.
Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1985) (relying on state law).
However, after Boyle, in a military case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that military in-
terests are unique and particularly sensitive. See Harduvel v. General Dynamics
Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding military interests incompatible
with state tort law). A lower court declined to extend the defense to service con-
tracts. See Amtreco, Inc. v. O.H. Materials, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 443, 445 (M.D. Ga.
1992). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has extended
the defense to nonmilitary contracts. See Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949 F. Supp.
898, 906 (D.D.C. 1996); Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1996).
State courts are also divided. See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (applying government contractor defense to non-
military contracts); Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994)
(implying in dicta that the defense does not apply to nonmilitary contracts); Rey-
nolds v. Penn Metal Fabricators, Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(refusing to apply government contractor defense to nonmilitary contracts).
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ness, tingling, or other arthritic conditions.'" The facts recited be-
low are taken from several of these multi-plaintiff cases."54
In 1958, Burroughs Corporation received its first contract to
construct ten prototype MPLSMs for the United States Postal Serv-
ice." In the early 1960s, Burroughs received a contract to manufac-
ture twenty-six MPLSMs.'" Postal employees oversaw production, re-
viewed and approved drawings, and ultimately approved the
equipment.'" By the 1970s, the contract called for two ten-key key-
boards placed on two tiers of each console."" Exact specifications of
the keyboard design were established in the contract. Moreover, the
contract provided that " [a]ll special safety devices... for protection
of operators... shall be provided as specified herein, or as shown on
the drawings."'" No alterations or warnings were allowed without
government approval.'4 The machines were modified with govern-
ment approval periodically until production stopped in 1986.'14
The defects alleged were abundant and included both design
and failure-to-warn deficiencies:
[Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Rani Leuder] first noted that most aspects
of the operator console, such as the operator knee clearance and
the keying and envelope slot height, were not adjustable, con-
trary to ergonomic principles. Furthermore, the keyboard failed
to offer arm support. Dr. Leuder also found that the keyboard
suffered from poor keyboard feedback, key vibration, inconsis-
tent key force, and poor keyboard design. He also found that
MPLSM operators underwent high rates of repetition and re-
ceived no ergonomic training. Finally, he found that the
"sweeping" task that operators performed during their breaks
from keying, which consisted of removing mail from the MPLSM
"8 See, e.g., Yeroshefsky, 962 F. Supp. 710; Houghtaling v. Unisys Corp., 955 F.
Supp. 309 (D.NJ. 1996); Haltiwanger, 949 F. Supp. 898; Fagans, 945 F. Supp. 3; An-
drew, 936 F. Supp. 821; Russek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277 (D.NJ. 1996);
Wuner, 917 F. Supp. 1501.
134 See, e.g., Haltiwanger, 949 F. Supp. 898; Andrew, 936 F. Supp. 821; Russek, 921
F. Supp. 1277; Schmid, 1996 WL 421843.
135 See Russek, 921 F. Supp. at 1283.
1N Seeid.
13 See id.
18 Apparently, 12 consoles and operator chairs were on each MPLSM. See
Houghtaling, 955 F. Supp. at 310. "The machine sends about 60 letters per minute
past each station, where a worker reads ZIP codes and enters them on two ten-key,
piano-style keyboards arranged in two tiers." Id.
139 Russek 921 F. Supp. at 1283 (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
140 See id.; see also Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (D. Md.
1997).
141 See Russek, 921 F. Supp. at 1283.
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sorting bins and further sorting it for ultimate distribution, pre-
sented an occupational risk because the height of the envelope
bins was not adjustable. Dr. Leuder concluded that all these al-
leged design defects could contribute to causing [repetitive-stress
injuries in] MPLSM operators. 142
At least by the late 1960s and early 1970s, both the Postal Service
and Burroughs recognized certain risks associated with the keyboard
and work-station design" A congressional hearing in 1984 identi-
fied carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis as risks common to
MPLSM operators.'" In 1981, the report of a long-term study under-
taken by the American Postal Workers Union and the National Insti-
tute of Occupational Safety and Health entitled "The Development
of Chronic Trauma Disorders Among Letter Sorting Machine Opera-
tors" was released. 45 Although Burroughs suggested various altera-
tions and changes, "[t]he Postal Service evaluated and ultimately re-
jected Burroughs' proposed modifications to the keyboard."
8
"Under the 1966 and 1974 contracts, Burroughs either suggested or
investigated alterations to the keyboard and console .... The Postal
Service evaluated and rejected all of these proposals."1'4  In 1974,
Burroughs specifically suggested manufacture of an "asynchronous
keyboard" and a "heel of hand" rest, modifications that might have
reduced repetitive-stress injuries.4 8
As a result of the identified link between MPLSM and worker in-
juries, employees began filing complaints.149 "In response [to worker
complaints and congressional inquiry], the Postal Service, through
its internal and contract research efforts, began to undertake modi-
fications to the Postal Service workplace, including, simplification of
the keying process, significant noise level reduction, and selection of
an adjustable operator chair.""'o
2. Application of Boyle to the MPLSM
There is no doubt, as the cases against Unisys so held, that the
three-prong Boyle test was met. Unquestionably, the Postal Service
142 Id. at 1284.
43 See Schmid v. Unisys Corp., No. 4:95CV00864, 1996 WL 421843, at *10 (E.D.
MoJuly 24, 1996).1 Sm id. at*11.
4 See id.
1 Id. at *12.
1 Andrewv. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821,828 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
SSeeRussek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277, 1291 (D.N.J. 1996).
SSee &hmid, 1996WL 421843, at*11.
150 Id. at * 12; see also Andrew, 936 F. Supp. at 828.
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exercised the requisite discretionary approval of reasonably precise
specifications in the design of the MPLSM as required under Boyle.'
Moreover, the plaintiffs in these suits did not contend that Bur-
roughs failed to comply with the contract specifications.! Finally,
evidence revealed that Burroughs informed the government of the
risks and that the government was at least as informed as the manu-
facturer of the risks associated with the design of the machine. 53
Thus, the application of Boyle is quite straightforward. The dif-
ficult question is whether Boyle should apply in the first place to a let-
ter-sorting machine manufactured for the United States Postal Serv-
ice. Unlike the Ninth Circuit decisions, these courts fail to make a
threshold Boyle inquiry as to whether important federal interests are
in significant conflict with imposing state tort liability. Instead, these
courts read Boyle as identifying both the parameters and scope of the
defense as any instance where government discretion in the product
design collides with state tort law. While government discretion was
certainly used in formulating the contract specifications and eco-
nomic consequences might have resulted by imposing tort liability
upon Burroughs, asking the threshold question is most revealing:
Are the federal interests to be protected as apparent in the procure-
ment of a letter-sorting machine as they are in the purchase of a
military fighter plane?'-"
To answer that question, one must examine the consequence of
the absence of a Boyle defense. The outcome under state law is ad-
mittedly variable. Assuming the product was defective, the manufac-
turer could have generally been held liable while the government
employer would have been immune under federal worker compensa-tin" 155
tion law. However, the government would have paid for the atten-
151 See Russek, 921 F. Supp. at 1288 ("continuous back and forth review process"
between the Postal Service and Burroughs in developing the design).
1"2 See id. at 1290.
15s See id. at 1291.
15 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n.1
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). As the Agent Orange court stated:
The purpose of the government contract[or] defense... is to permit
the government to wage war in whatever manner the government
deems advisable, and to do so with the support of suppliers of military
weapons. Considerations of cost, time of production, risks to partici-
pants, risks to third parties, and any other factors that might weigh on
the decisions of whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon,
are uniquely questions for the military and should be exempt from re-
view by civilian courts.
Id.
155 See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8116(c), 8173 (1996)
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dant tort risks of product use through product pricing. On the
other hand, if a non-employee was injured, then the government
would be immune as a result of the discretionary function and the
manufacturer could be held liable. Again, the government would
have paid for liability risks at the onset through product pricing. In
addition, the manufacturer might have a defense in some states
based either on sovereign immunity or agency under state law,' 1 or
upon a state-law specifications defense.5'
As courts surmise, without Boyle there would be times, in some
states, where the government would be immune (under federal sov-
ereign immunity principles or worker compensation laws) and the
contractor could be sued. It is also true that the absence of the de-
fense subjects the contractors to the laws, however disparate, of the
fifty states. These arguments for the defense are not persuasive. Na-
tional manufacturers routinely labor under nonuniform laws of the
several states. Even the federal government abides by state tort law
and accepts diverse outcomes.'9 Erroneously, some suggest Boyle re-
flects a need for uniform treatment of government contractors."
Consistency in law across the states, however, was never articulated as
a goal in Boyle, although the Court did acknowledge that consistency
sometimes justifies preemption. 60
(exclusive remedy).1 See Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir.
1990); Blizzard v. Motorola Inc., No. 94-0207, 1995 WL 216938, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa.
Apr 12, 1995).See Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1455-56; Louis FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LiABILrr § 2.02[2], at 2-78 (1994); 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPo, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILrrv 12.10[21 (2d ed. 1990) (citing cases wherein courts refused to impose
liability where products manufactured in accordance with plans and specifications,
except where plans are patently defective).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994 & Supp. 1997) ("The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"). See gener-
ally Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) (choosing to be governed by law
of state where tort occurs); Faughnan v. Big Apple Car Serv., 828 F. Supp. 155
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (same).
159 See Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir.
1989) ('uniformity... is a key justification for application of federal common
law").
160 Boyle explained that sometimes preemption of state law is desirable because of
a need for uniform treatment, but the Court did not bottom the government con-
tractor defense on such a need for uniformity. "In some cases, for example where
the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable
to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal laws." Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 508 (1988) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
866-67 (1948) (exploring rights and obligations of United States with regard to
commercial paper)). Instead, the Court articulated a need to preempt state prod-
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In the case of the MPLSM, at first blush Boyle appears to correct
a fundamental unfairness to Burroughs. Without Boyle, Burroughs
might be held liable in some jurisdictions for design flaws recog-
nized and approved by the government, yet Burroughs would be un-
able to seek indemnification or contribution from the United States
despite federal fault. 6' In a nonmilitary context, does this outcome
outweigh the state interest in allowing victims to recover against the
manufacturer?
162
As discussed earlier, a manufacturer, doing business with the
government and aware that the government will ultimately be im-
mune from product-liability suits, can finance its own risk of liability
by either (1) raising the product's price to insure against or other-
wise fund the anticipated losses or, ideally, (2) expending extra
money to manufacture a safer product.6 ' This is the basic premise of
strict liability. Although the second option was not available to Bur-
roughs because the Postal Service refused to approve the suggested
modifications offered by Burroughs, Burroughs was free to charge
more for the MPLSM given its knowledge of potential injuries and
liability exposure.'" Burroughs could have given the government the
uct-liability law only in cases where state law conflicted with governmental discre-
don. State product-liability law still applies to federal procurement of "off-the-rack"
purchases or where state law and federal specifications are compatible. "No one
suggests that state law would generally be pre-empted in this context." Baye, 487
U.S. at 509.
1 This is especially so in light of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1993
& Supp. 1997), which precludes open-ended indemnification clauses. See Hercules
Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 987-88 (1996) (finding no express or implied-
in-fact indemnity provisions permitted to cover manufacturer's liability to tort
claimants).
162 Like Justice Brennan, some scholars question Boyle's correctness even in mili-
tary procurement. See, e.g., Cass & Gillette, supra note 101, at 335 (concluding that
Boyle does not achieve ideal outcome); Kellman, supra note 81, at 1648 (urging ju-
dicial deference to military-notjudicial abdication). But cf. Davis, supra note 86, at
1100 (observing that Boyle should apply in limited military circumstances).
16s See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 517; Rabin, supra note 7, at 213; Schwartz, supra
note 7, at 436.
MA In this case, Burroughs probably did pass on these risks because the defense
was not well established until 1988. See generally Hercules Inc. v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 981 (1996) (tracing development of the government contractor defense).
Arguably, the marked-up price reflects the "true" cost of the product. See
Wertheimer, supra note 101, at 195 n.25.
The policy of distributing the costs of product injuries by holding the
manufacturer liable serves to compel the manufacturer to take into
account the real costs of the product. When the manufacturer alters a
product's price to cover the costs of the injuries caused by the prod-
uct, the price then demonstrates the product's true cost to society.
This result is desirable because it allows consumers to better appreci-
ate the true costs of a particular product and consequently decide
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option of either paying more for the machine or accepting the
modifications. Had the government official confronted this choice,
that official would have been better informed of the risks and bene-
fits of the MPLSM as designed. Contrary to having a negative finan-
cial or discretionary impact, this scenario actually has a positive im-
pact. The discretion of the government officer would actually have
been enhanced (rather than undermined) if Burroughs revealed the
cost of managing the risk of harm associated with the manufacture
of the MPLSM as designed.1 65 The government pays an artificially de-
flated cost when injury is not accounted for in the price of the arti-
cle.
Finally, there is an inescapable moral component to risk alloca-
tion. If, as alleged in the case of the MPLSMs, Burroughs suspected
as early as 1966'6 that a better design could minimize injuries, it had
thirty years and approximately nine-hundred MPLSMs over which to
spread the risk of the injuries it could foresee. Postal Service em-
ployees had no such time or ability to plan for their eventual diseases
and injuries.'67
The story of the MPLSMjustifies requiring the cost of injury to
be borne by the manufacturer at the end-stage through lawsuits. It
also justifies permitting and encouraging the manufacturer to pass
those costs on to the United States at the beginning of the transac-
tion through increased contract prices for the manufacture of hun-
dreds of machines.'6" In short, without factoring in external costs,
Boyle dissuades federal officers from exercising reasonable discretion
and instead encourages the decision to purchase products at the
cheapest price without regard to personal injury.
The United States refused to permit modifications and Bur-
roughs continued to manufacture the machines despite their collec-
tive knowledge that the machines, as designed, caused physical injury
to nonmilitary federal workers engaged in the blue-collar enterprise
of sorting the United States mail. Only when employees filed com-
plaints and Congress investigated their claims did the United States
whether or not to purchase it.
Id.
16 Because these were federal employees, the United States actually suffered a
loss in the form of worker compensation payments that is not recoverable. The
federal official should have considered the cost of those claims in rejecting product
improvements.
16 SeAndrewv. Unisys Corp., 986 F. Supp. 821,828 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
1 See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 517 (noting that it is preferable to charge all
consumers at the outset than to let all risk fall on the injured consumer).
16 See Schmid v. Unisys Corp., No. 4:95CV00864, 1996 WL 421848, at *5 (E.D.
Mo. 1996).
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consent to modifications. From these events, one can conclude that
external pressure played a significant role in the eventual modifica-
tions of the machine. Allowing tort liability to serve as that external
force in improving product safety or deterring irresponsible design
decisions is exactly what both the government and the manufacturer
needed in order to exercise reasonable, responsible discretion in the
design of the MPLSM. 69 Allowing government officials to assume
that injury to civilians is "costless" proved a grave error in this case.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF BOYLETO FAILURE-TO-WARN CASES
Burroughs' and the government's failure to warn MPLSM users
about the potential for crippling injuries is even more difficult tojus-
tiff/ than the government's refusal to permit design modifications.
The following sections review the application of Boyle in the context
of failure-to-warn claims.
At common law, a product manufacturer has a duty in negli-
gence to warn users of potential dangers associated with the in-
tended or foreseeable uses of its products if the manufacturer knows
or should know the dangers. While there is little distinction in a
failure-to-warn claim based upon strict liability as opposed to negli-
gence, the appropriate inquiry in strict liability is "whether the prod-
uct was defective in light of the warnings that accompanied it.""0
When looking at government contracts and state tort law liabil-
ity for failure to warn users of dangerous products, the issue is
whether Boyle applies at all-and if so, how. Should the common-law
duty to warn of dangers associated with a product be excused in light
of the contractual specifications for the product approved by the
government? How to apply Boyle to failure-to-warn claims has been
the source of considerable controversy among the circuits. Three
standards have emerged.
A. Duty to Warn Unless Prohibited by the Discretionary Act of a
Government Official
Several circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have been circum-
spect when determining whether the state-law duty to warn is pre-
empted by application of the defense." An example of a narrow ap-
169 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 422-30.
1/0 Frederick C. Schafrick, Product Liability Suits for Failure to Warn of the Hazards of
Regulated Products, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 833, 888 (1997); see alsoJOHN L. DAMOND ET
AIL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 345-46 (1996).
171 In this regard, the Second and Eleventh Circuits appear in accord with the
Ninth Circuit. In Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 898 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir.
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plication of Boyle in the failure-to-warn context is Snell v. Bell Helicop-
172ter Textron, Inc., where families of three individuals who died in a
Marine Corps UH-1N helicopter crash filed suit against the manufac-
turer of the helicopter and component-parts manufacturers. 7  Bell
asserted the "military contractor defense" and sought summary
judgment.7 1 As to when Boyle will apply to preempt common law
failure-to-warn claims, the court explained:
[A]s for the application of the military contractor defense against
it, Bell would have to show that "in making its decision whether
to provide a warning... [it] was acting in compliance with rea-
sonably precise specifications imposed on it by the United
States."
Bell has shown neither that "the government considered the ap-
propriate warnings, if any, that should accompany the product,"
nor that it "approved reasonably precise specifications" constrain-
ing Bell's ability to comply with whatever duty to warn it may have
had.
175
1990) (per curiam), for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that while Boy/e applies
to failure-to-warn claims, the defendant must show that the contractor could not
comply with the specifications of the contract and its state-law duty to warn. The
contractor in Dorse was not precluded by government specifications from attaching
warning labels to its asbestos insulation and therefore could not claim the benefit of
the defense. See id. at 1490.
Similarly, in In rejoint Eastern & Southern District New York Asbestos Litigation, 897
F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit stated:
[The defendant] must show that the applicable federal contract in-
cludes warning requirements that significantly conflict with those that
might be imposed by state law.... The contractor must show that
whatever warnings accompanied a product resulted from a determina-
tion of a government official.., and thus that the Government itself
"dictated" the content of the warnings meant to accompany the prod-
uct
Id. at 630.
17 107 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 1997).
173 See id. at 745.
174 First, the court denied summary judgment as to the design defect. See id. at
748-49. The court explained that, while the helicopter was indisputably military
equipment, the government left the placement and design of the allegedly defective
drive shaft to Bell. See id. at 748. The court held that the government had not
"approved reasonably precise specifications" of the drive shaft, and thus issues of
fact remained on the application of the first prong of Boye. See id. The court next
ruled that, while Boyle may apply to manufacturing defects as well as design defects,
the lack of reasonably precise specifications precluded application of the defense in
this instance. See id. at 749.
175 Id. at 749 (citations omitted); see also Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89
F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1996) (remanding for determination of whether Navy con-
tract conflicted with contractor's duty to warn under state law).
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In the Ninth Circuit, Boyle will only prevent liability of a contrac-
tor for failure to warn when the government contract specifications
place the contractor's performance of the contract in conflict with
the common-law duty to warn product users. 76 This rule is consis-
tent with Boyle's demand that the defense apply only with respect to
products made from precise specifications. As Boyle noted, without
the precise-specification requirement, "It]he contractor could com-
ply with both its contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty
of care. No one suggests that state law would generally be pre-
empted in this context."'"
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is no
sound justification for disallowing federal workers exposed to dan-
gerous products from making an informed choice to protect them-
selves or even leave their jobs. In holding the government contrac-
tor defense inapplicable to a failure-to-warn claim absent a showing
of conflict between the specifications and the state-law duty to warn,
the Ninth Circuit suggested the arrogance of keeping government
workers ignorant of product dangers:
That the inadequacy of the defendants' warnings was a legal
cause of the plaintiffs' injuries cannot be denied. The plaintiffs
could have taken precautionary measures or left their jobs had
they been warned of the dangers.... Thus, even were asbestos
insulation "military equipment," we would affirm the district
court's decision to preclude the military contractor defense. 78
The Ninth Circuit takes seriously Boyle's edict to search first for a
"federal policy or interest" in "significant conflict" with the operation
of state law 79 before allowing the government contractor defense,
even in the context of military equipment. Boyle should not indulge
the immoral fear that informed workers will make informed choices
to protect themselves from injury.
176 See Butler, 89 F.3d at 586. The Butler court stated:
Whereas the government contractor's defense may be used to trump a
design defect claim by proving that the government, not the contrac-
tor, is responsible for the defective design, that defense is inapplicable
to a failure to warn claim in the absence of evidence that in making its
decision whether to provide a warning against use of the padeye to lift
the platform, or some other suitable warning, Ingalls was "acting in
compliance with 'reasonably precise specifications' imposed on [it] by
the United States."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
177 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509 (1988).
178 In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1992).
119 See Boy/l, 487 U.S. at 507.
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B. The Government Promulgates or Approves Reasonably Precise
Specifications as to the Design Itself
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have held that
where the government contractor defense has been successfully in-
voked as to a design defect, the failure-to-warn claim as to that defect
is also barred:"* "[W]here the manufacturer has established a Boyle
defense as to the design defect, and the relevant specifications are
silent as to warnings, Boyle bars the failure to warn claim as well." 8'
These courts reason that the "'continuous back and forth' as to the
product feature containing the alleged design defect.., resulted in
a government-approved specification that did not include warn-
ings."1s2 The Fifth Circuit has correctly clarified, however, that if the
failure to warn is a wholly separate defect claim, then Boyle requires
the defendant to establish "an identifiable federal interest or policy
in the existence or methods of warning and a significant conflict be-
tween the federal interest or policy and the operation of state law."'"
Under this reasoning, when the design defect is protected un-
der Boyle; courts do not require evidence that the manufacturer sug-
gested warnings and was rebuffed or that warnings were specifically
considered during the approval process and mutually discarded.'"
Instead, these courts are satisfied that an approval of the product as
designed necessarily approved the product as designed with the
warnings included or omitted.
18O See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570 (5th
Cir. 1996), modified on denial of reh'g, Perez v. Lockheed Corp., 88 F.3d 340 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied sub. nom. Chase v. Lockheed Corp., 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996); Bailey v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1998); Stout v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1989); Russek v. Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277 (D.N.J. 1996); Koutsoubos v. Boe-
ing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
181 Russek, 921 F. Supp. at 1293 ("The Court believes that this approach is most
consonant with Carly [v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993)]"); see also In
re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 81 F.3d at 576 ("[I]f the failure to warn claim is
part of the design defect or unreasonably dangerous product theory of liability,
then government contractor immunity applies").
182 Russek 921 F. Supp. at 1294.
183 In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 81 F.3d at 576 (quoting Garner v. San-
toro, 865 F.2d 629, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1989)).
1 See Slawotsky, supra note 79, at 945 ("[A] specification that does not reference
a warning should be considered tantamount to a specification that prohibits
them .... To hold otherwise would render the contractor defense illusory").
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C. A Middle Ground: The Government Approved the Warnings
Between these two poles, some judicial decisions have migrated
toward the middle ground articulated in Tate v. Boeing Helicopters.85
These courts require that-just as with the design itself-in order to
invoke the defense, the warnings or lack of warnings be considered
in a "continuous back and forth" process between the government
and the contractor. 18
In Tate, one crash survivor and several family members of two
deceased soldiers filed suit against the manufacturer of an army heli-
copter alleging that design defects and the manufacturer's failure to
warn caused the crash of an aircraft. Five army soldiers suffered in-
jury or death as a result of a training mission aboard a Chinook heli-
copter."7 The soldiers were training to attach heavy equipment to
the helicopter using a three-hook system mounted to the underside
of the craft.' During the nighttime mission, the crew attached a
15,760 pound block of concrete to the craft using night-vision gog-
gles. "' Unfortunately, the block of concrete caught on a hill as it was
lifted and worked as an anchor when the pilot attempted to level the
aircraft. The helicopter pitched forward and crashed. Three sol-
diers died and two suffered injuries in the crash.'
19 55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Wagner, supra note 67, at 389 (arguing
that government contractors should not bear the cost of government decisions and
need more protection from suits).
Two recent decisions suggest that both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits are ac-
tually migrating toward a Tate standard. See In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 81
F.3d at 576 (refining an earlier Fifth Circuit rule to require a "significant conflict"
between state law and government specifications when the warning claim is separate
from the design-defect claim). See generally Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89
F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no requirement that government must actually
prohibit warnings).
16 See Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1996)
(applying Tate), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1246 (1997);Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962
F. Supp. 710, 718 (D. Md. 1997) (adopting Tate); Houghtaling v. Unisys Corp., 955
F. Supp. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1996) (determining that under either the Fifth or Sixth
Circuit approach, the defense is applicable where the postal service required all
safety devices be approved and where "Unisys could not add warnings, markings, or
labels to the MEPLSM" without approval); Fagans v. Unisys Corp., 945 F. Supp. 3, 6-7
(D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the government contractor defense is applicable to a
failure-to-warn claim, where the postal service provided specifications for all safety
devices and required that they be followed-thus applying Tate); Wisner v. Unisys
CoIW., 917 F. Supp. 1501, 1512 (D. Kan. 1996) (adopting Tate).
See Tate, 55 F.3d at 1152.In See id.i n S e e id .
180 See id. at 1151.
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In addition to claiming that the design of the hook system was
faulty,'91 plaintiffs also alleged that the manufacturer "failed to ade-
quately warn the crew members of the dangers associated with use of
the tandem hook system." 19 2 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case on
the failure-to-warn claim, ruling that "the government contractor de-
fense is not necessarily established merely by satisfying the govern-
ment contractor defense conditions as to the design defect claims."' 5
The court concluded that, separate and apart from applying the
defense to a defective design claim, a failure-to-warn claim requires a
distinct showing that (1) a government official exercised discretion
in approving warnings intended for users, if any, (2) the contractor
provided warnings conforming to the approved warnings, and (3)
the contractor warned the government of the dangers concerning
the use of its product of which it knew and the government did
not.'94 In order to apply the defense, the court specifically required
that approval of the warnings or the decision not to warn undergo
the same back and forth approval process required by design defect
claims.'"
By requiring a Boyle analysis of the separate state-law failure-to-
warn claim, the Tate rule recognizes that Boyle requires the exercise
of government discretion in the context of the alleged defect, and
the claimed defect in these cases is the deficiency of warnings-not
the design itself.'" It also recognizes that the defect of inadequate
warning is a separate and distinct claim from a design-defect claim
even as to the same component part under state law.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit approach, Tate ensures that contractors
will raise the issue of warnings to the government when designing a
product, thus serving Boyle's goal of ensuring that the government is
191 Applying Boyle to the design-defect claim, the court concluded that the Army
had engaged in "back and forth" collaboration in the development of the hook sys-
tem, that the system conformed to the specifications, and that "the Army was aware
of all the dangers of which the contractors were aware." Id. at 1156.
19 Id.
193 Tate, 55 F.3d at 1157.
19 See id.
195 See id. On remand, the lower court held that the contractor was entitled to
the defense on the failure-to-warn claim. The contractor showed that the helicop-
ter's training manual was created over a one-and-a-half year period with continuous
discussions, review, updating, and revision by the army and the manufacturer. See
Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 921 F. Supp. 1562, 1567 (W.D. Ky. 1996).
1 See Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996)
(expressly adopting Tate and finding that the "touchstone" in failure-to-warn claims
is whether the discretionary function of the government is implicated by the warn-
ing decisions), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1246 (1997).
1997]
SETONIHALL LA WREVIEW [Vol. 28:430
well-informed in exercising its discretion. However, the more narrow
rule of the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits is superior. By re-
quiring a conflict between the specifications and state tort law duties
to warn, the rule not only ensures that contractors will raise the issue
of warnings to government officers, but also that contractors will
comply with state law to the extent possible without violating the
terms of the contract.
D. The Failure To Warn Has NoJustification Outside the Military
Arena
Outside the military context, there is little social utility in failing
to warn consumers of dangers associated with the use of products.
In fact, the immorality of Boyle's application in the warning context
underscores the general irresponsibility Boyle engenders outside the
military context where there is no "greater good" justification.
Products not purchased to defend the nation from enemy forces
need not be cloaked in Boyle's defenses.
Boyle can be justified within the military, even in the warning
context, because typically soldiers must perform regardless of the
danger or their knowledge of the danger.' Arguably, there may be
legitimate reasons not to warn soldiers of dangers associated with the
activity or product use."8 As the Ninth Circuit explained, "a warning
197 Soldiers are not free to refuse a lawful order out of personal fear of the con-
sequences. See, for example, United States v. Taliy, 17 MJ. 1127, 1129 (N-M.C.M.R.
1984):
Appellant urges that the duress resulted from his genuine apprehen-
sion that entry into the reactor compartment would expose him to
hazardous levels of radiation and thereby cause irreparable genetic
damage.... Appellant's contention that duress, amounting to a legal
defense, can inhere in a lawful order requiring performance of mili-
tary duty "in harm's way" simply strains credulity. Regardless of the
sincerity of his beliefs, the premise upon which he rests this defense
has no basis in military law.
Id.
198 There may be a military purpose in not warning soldiers of dangerous prod-
ucts because knowledge of the danger does not excuse its ordered use, if that order
is lawful. For example, in Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991), a soldier
challenged the Department of Defense's (DOD) authority prior to Gulf War de-
ployment to order ingestion of experimental drugs designed to combat potential
chemical warfare exposure. See id. at 1371-73. The drugs pyridostigmine and botu-
linum toxoid were classified as "investigational" by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). See id. at 1372 & n.1. The DOD sought and obtained an FDA waiver of
the military's informed consent obligations. See id. at 1374. The appellate court
held that (1) the informed-consent requirements were not feasible in light of the
war and (2) the FDA's waiver of the informed-consent requirement was lawful. See
id. at 1382. The court expressed extreme deference to military decisions. See id. at
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directly to crews of the... [defectively designed] aircraft... would
not have prevented the accidents here, since the crews had no choice
but to fly[."'
On the other hand, civilian workers and civilians generally
should be free to protect themselves from injury or to avoid expo-
sure to danger. To the extent warnings serve that purpose, there is
no rational contrary government purpose to protect." Civilian
postal workers sorting mail for the United States were entitled to be
warned that the machines at which they labored posed a serious
health risk to their hands and arms that one day might jeopardize
their ability to enjoy activities and pursuits within their private lives.
These workers might have, on personal balance, left their jobs or
otherwise protected themselves from the exposure to repetitive-stress
injuries. Furthermore, they might have demanded changes to the
machines, taken more frequent breaks, varied their position at the
work station, or worn wrist guards and splints. They were afforded
no such opportunities despite state products liability laws that re-
quired the manufacturer to place warnings on these machines or
bear the liability consequences. As a result of Boye, no one is held
accountable for the losses suffered as a result of this failure to pro-
vide warnings.
V. CONCLUSION
When the government contractor defense is applied to the pro-
curement of military equipment in contracts of import to national
security and defense, it serves important government interests. It ac-
commodates the military's organizational structure that necessarily
requires government officers to weigh profound risks of personal in-
jury against matters of national security and defense.
Such important federal interests are not at stake in other types
of federal procurement. The defense should not extend to other
government contractors because its application discourages accurate
pricing of manufactured goods, including the cost of injury and
harm to the public. The defense promotes a less-informed exercise
1380. While acknowledging that medical treatment is an important individual lib-
erty, the court nevertheless agreed with the DOD's position that use of the drugs
without informed consent was justified because "administering the drugs uniformly
prevents unnecessary danger to troops and medical personnel from injury to, or the
death of, fellow military personnel in battle." Id. at 1383.
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 455 (9th Cir. 1983).
See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding that had the shipyard workers been warned of the deadly effects of asbestos
exposure they "could have taken precautionary measures or left theirjobs").
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of discretion by government officers who need not consider the cost
of injury when deciding whether a product, as designed, is worth its
cost. It engages the fiction that every government contract with rea-
sonably precise specifications represents the discretionary act of a
government official who has weighed the risks and benefits of a
product design. Yet it provides no incentive for that official to con-
sider the risk and cost of personal injury.
As to its application to failure-to-warn claims, the public good
from warnings far outweighs the risk that the government might
have had a reason for precluding the manufacturer from placing
warnings on its products, especially outside of the military context.
Thus, a narrow test requiring manufacturers to abide by state tort law
unless precluded by a demonstrated conflict with government speci-
fications balances the public good by requiring that any contractor
who seeks to shield itself behind the federal government must have
suggested that the government place warnings on products in com-
pliance with state law.
The government contractor defense forgives manufacturers for
product defects causing personal injury that would otherwise be
compensable under state law. Because the defense so fundamentally
changes the principles of accountability, deterrence, and compensa-
tion rooted in state tort law, in each instance the Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly examines the federal interest at stake. The defense should be
limited to those cases where the most important federal interests col-
lide with state tort law interests. Courts giving broad application of
the defense fail to appreciate the important public-safety interests
served by tort liability.
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